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Abstract
In contrast to non-partisan GOTV campaigns, political parties do not aim to increase
turnout across the board. Instead, their principal goal is to affect the outcome of an
election in their favor. To find out how they realize this aim, we carried out a ran-
domized field experiment to evaluate the effect of campaign visits and leafleting by
Conservative Party canvassers on turnout in a marginal English Parliamentary con-
stituency during the 2014 European and Local Elections. Commonly-used campaign
interventions, leaflets and door-knocks, changed the composition of the electorate in
favor of the Conservative Party, but did not increase turnout overall. Supporters of
rival parties, particularly Labour self-identifiers, were significantly less likely to mobi-
lize in response to Conservative campaign contact than Conservative supporters. In
contrast to the non-partisan GOTV literature, we show that impersonal campaign
leaflets were as effective in shaping the local electorate in the Conservative’s favor as
personal visits. The common practice of contacting all constituents irrespective of their
party preferences was effective as a campaign tactic, but had no civic benefits in the
aggregate.
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Rather surprisingly, the key findings from non-partisan Get Out the Vote (GOTV)
campaigns—that campaign interventions have civic benefits by increasing electoral participa-
tion, and that personalized interventions are more effective than impersonal contact methods
(Green and Gerber 2008; Green, Aronow, and McGrath 2013)—do not fully generalise to
partisan campaigns. In spite of using similar contact methods, such as canvassing, telephone
calls and leafleting, extant field studies randomizing contact with a partisan campaign show
mixed results (Arceneaux 2007; Doherty and Adler 2014; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King
2006; Green 2004; Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2014; Bailey, Hopkins, and Rogers 2016;
Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Barton, Castillo, and Petrie 2014). Green, Aronow, and Mc-
Grath (2013) conclude from their meta-analysis of 79 experiments using non-partisan direct
mail and 31 experiments using advocacy-direct mail, including both party-and issue-based
endorsements, that the effects of non-partisan mailings and advocacy mailings differ signifi-
cantly. While non-partisan direct mail on average has a positive effect on turnout, advocacy
mailings have a negative, but statistically insignificant effect. It is particularly striking that
field experiments that randomize partisan contact at the aggregate level have consistently
failed to show an increase in voter turnout (Ramiro, Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012; Pons
2014; Pons and Liegey 2016; Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2014).
To conclude from these mixed results that partisan campaigns are ineffective at influenc-
ing turnout is to misunderstand the goal of political parties when they make contact with
voters. In contrast to non-partisan campaigns, political parties are not civic charities. They
do not aim to increase turnout across the board (Gerber 2004; Holbrook and McClurg 2005;
Nickerson 2005). Instead, parties want to change the outcome of an electoral contest and
there are different strategies of achieving this goal. Of course parties can act strategically
and target GOTV efforts at party supporters or at places with the greatest density of sup-
port in a targeted mobilization strategy. In reality, most parties in countries other than the
United States and Britain cannot follow this campaign strategy because they do not have
access to valid and reliable data that would allow them to discriminate effectively between
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their supporters and opponents in the electorate. It is therefore no surprise that campaign
experiments conducted with political parties in France, Spain and Italy have consistently
failed to show positive effects on turnout (Ramiro, Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012; Pons
2016; Pons and Liegey 2016; Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2014).
Even in the United States and Britain, where campaign targeting and canvassing is more
advanced than elsewhere, it may explicitly make sense to include supporters of rival parties
as targets of campaign interventions, assuming that campaign communication can win over
voters or reduce turnout amongst those unlikely to support the party or candidate. For
political parties and candidates, the key is to change the composition of the electorate, not
to increase turnout. Many real-world campaign interventions include a double-edged appeal
both to turnout and to vote for a particular candidate or party (for a discussion, see Nicker-
son, Friedrichs, and King 2006, p. 86). However, in spite of experimental results pointing to
the possibility that political preferences might condition mobilization effects (McNulty 2005;
Shi 2015; Foos and de Rooij 2016), the large majority of field experiments that randomize
contact at the aggregate (Pons 2014; Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2014) or the individ-
ual level (Nickerson 2005; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006) have problems identifying
heterogeneous mobilization effects conditional on pre-intervention party support. At the
aggregate level, null effects might mask that the intervention mobilized party supporters,
but demobilized opponents. This possibility is of course particularly pronounced in multi-
party systems such as Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy, where supporters of one
particular party make up a smaller fraction of the electorate.
Aiming to throw more light on the effects of partisan campaign interventions on the
partisan composition of the electorate, this paper reports results from a Conservative Party
ground campaign using personal door-to-door visits and impersonal leaflets. The research
site is the English town of Keynsham in the North East Somerset parliamentary constituency.
Working with the local constituency Conservative Party in the run up to the 2014 European
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Parliament elections,1 the intervention included 6,123 registered voters.
Using the constituency office records on individual party support, we estimate the effect
of the treatment on turnout overall, and on the turnout of supporters of different political
parties. We find that the party’s ground campaign, based on leaflets and door-to-door
canvassing, did not increase turnout overall, but instead had a negative effect. Our analyses
show that the campaign had a significantly more negative effect on supporters of rival parties
than on supporters of the Conservative Party.
In this way, using campaign tactics that are frequently employed by Conservative con-
stituency campaigns in the UK, the interventions worked to the party’s advantage while
failing to increase turnout at the aggregate. This study contributes to a more nuanced un-
derstanding of how ground campaigns can shape the composition of the electorate, while
adding to the growing literature that points to some of the paradoxical consequences of
campaign interventions for political participation (Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck 2014).
How Can Campaign Contact Shape the Composition of
the Electorate?
We are of course not the first to entertain the thought that partisan campaigns might result
in differential turnout effects. As Holbrook and McClurg (2005, 695) argue, ‘[presidential]
campaigns are most influential in shaping the partisan composition of the electorate rather
than its overall size’. Moreover, as conclusions from two large field experiments conducted
in collaboration with the French and Spanish Socialist Parties show, partisan ground cam-
paigns routinely fail to lead to higher turnout in the aggregate, while at the same time
increasing the vote share of the party that initiates the campaign intervention. While both
Ramiro (2012, 23) and Pons (2014) explicitly mention that their intervention also targeted
1Constituency Conservative parties have responsibility for canvassing at all elections as well as for the
parliamentary poll.
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supporters of rival parties, and they briefly entertain the thought that their intervention
could have demobilized opponents, they opt for an explanation focused on persuasion rather
than differential mobilization. As Pons (2014, 164) writes:
There are two possible interpretations of the results. The first is that the in-
tervention mobilized left-wing nonvoters and cross-pressured and demobilized an
equal number of (far) right-wing voters (Fiorina 1976).
It is not only field experiments that measure turnout at the aggregate level that show
results consistent with differential mobilization. McNulty (2005, 53) found that Republicans
that were contacted by a Democratic campaign were less likely to vote than the control group,
albeit his sample size of Republican supporters was too small to detect significant effects.
Stronger evidence is presented by Shi (2015) who examines the effects of a campaign on same
sex marriage that demobilized Republicans opposed to the issue. As Shi (2015) indicates,
there is an important theoretical explanation for why campaigns can lead to demobilization
among opponents. Political information that conflicts with political beliefs, attitudes or pre-
dispositions can create internal cross-pressure (Fiorina 1976; Hillygus and Shields 2008) and
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) among voters. This work on cross-pressure goes back
to the classic studies of electoral politics (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). One means of avoiding internal cross-pressure and cognitive
dissonance is to abstain from making a choice (Hirschman 1970; Fiorina 1976). Campaigns
that target supporters of rival parties might hence affect their turnout behavior via those
psychological mechanisms. Exit might be a rational strategy for cross-pressured citizens if
they want to relieve the cognitive dissonance caused by campaign interventions from candi-
dates they oppose. Non-voting relieves the tension of voting for one’s party when pressured
not to do so, but it also prevents the tension that would be induced by being disloyal. For a
campaign, it is beneficial if rival party supporters are demobilized. If they do not turn out,
they do not vote for the other candidate. Even if voters followed an acceptance-rejection
rule according to which they would be less likely to accept campaign messages from sources
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that did not match their partisan preferences (Zaller 1992), we would still expect differential
mobilization effects between supporters of the party that initiates contact and supporters of
rival parties (Foos and de Rooij 2016). The only worry for a campaign should be counter-
mobilization that might occur when supporters of rival parties do the opposite of what a
campaign would want them to do (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). While messages have been
shown to ‘backfire’ in survey experiments (see, for instance, Nyhan and Reifler 2010), Arce-
neaux and Kolodny (2009) remain the only researchers to detect counter-mobilization effects
as a results of randomized campaign interventions in the field. As a campaign strategy,
demobilization might hence be particularly effective in challenging electoral environments
where parties have trouble persuading supporters of other parties and where their own sup-
porters are difficult to mobilize. In such cases, reducing turnout among opponents could be
the most cost-effective way of tipping the partisan balance of an electorate in a party’s favor.
Are Standard, Light-Touch, Campaign Methods Effec-
tive?
Other dimensions on which to understand the difference between partisan and non-partisan
GOTV campaigns are mode and content. One of the best-known and most widely cited result
from the non-partisan GOTV literature is that face-to-face contact (Green and Gerber 2008;
Green, Aronow, and McGrath 2013), and heavy hitting interventions such as social pressure
mailings (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008) are most effective at encouraging turnout.
But inherent differences between partisan and non-partisan campaigns may explain why
messages might fail to reproduce some of the effect hierarchies that we have come to expect
from non-partisan GOTV campaigns. In fact, while some partisan experiments replicate ex-
pected hierarchies of treatments, such as Arceneaux (2007) and Nickerson (2006), others do
not (Shaw, Green, Gimpel, and Gerber 2012; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006; McNulty
2005; Adams and Smith 1980; Doherty and Adler 2014). Light-touch and even impersonal
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interventions might be effective in a partisan context because parties have a history of in-
teracting with constituents. Establishing a social connection between the campaign and the
voter through social interaction, which is seen as an important stimulus of turnout (Rogers,
Fox, and Gerber 2012), would therefore be unnecessary. In these circumstances impersonal
forms of communication might be sufficient to affect electoral behavior in repeated interac-
tions. It is striking that when sent to voters who already interacted with a campaign, even
impersonal light-touch methods such as text messages are effective at increasing turnout
(Dale and Strauss 2009). Dale and Strauss (2009) argue that in this case text messages are
effective because they are noticeable reminders.
If we combine the idea of repeated interactions using noticeable but light-touch inter-
ventions with the low-salience context of the European and local elections in the UK, we
might expect that noticeable party reminders, no matter their form, will mostly influence
voters who vote in General Elections, but who are at the verge of non-voting because of the
low-salience of the second order election.
From this review, we would not expect a partisan campaign targeted towards the entire
electorate to result in higher levels of turnout. Yet, even impersonal and light-touch modes
of campaign interactions might be effective at shaping the composition of the electorate
because campaigns relate to already existing social and political connections. Our differential
mobilization hypothesis hence predicts that campaign interventions will lead party supporters
(and to a lesser extent) unattached voters who are at the verge of non-voting to continue
voting, while supporters of rival parties who are at the verge of non-voting in the low salience
election might be pushed across the abstention threshold because they are cross-pressured
by interacting with a party they dislike.
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Study Design
The site of the study was the small town in Keynsham in the west of England. The inter-
vention was organised and delivered by the staff at the North East Somerset Conservative
Party constituency offices in the three-week campaign period before the 2014 European Elec-
tions, which took place on 22 May. Keynsham is in the South West European Parliament
constituency, which has six MEPs (before the 2014 election, which saw two Conservatives,
two United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), one Green and one Labour MEP elected,
three out of six MEPs were Conservative, one Liberal Democrat and two UKIP.). The study
area was the wards of North and South Keynsham which are within walking distance of
the constituency office. North Keynsham has 2,073 dwellings, and 5,035 individuals; South
Keynsham has 2,253 dwellings and 5,019 individuals. All addresses with registered voters
in the two wards were selected. Postal voters were removed on the grounds that they would
have already cast their ballots by the time of the campaign. Hard-to-reach addresses, such as
homes for the elderly, were removed where these were known. Randomization was blocked by
ward: in Keynsham North, out of 1,660 households (3,253 individuals), 500 were randomly
allocated to the canvass group and 500 to the leaflet group; in Keynsham South, out of 1,559
households (2,870 individuals), two randomly selected groups of 500 were also allocated to
canvass and leaflet groups. This procedure created the final sample: 1,000 households to be
canvassed; 1,000 to receive a leaflet; and the rest—1,219—to be left in the control group. An
innovative aspect of this design is that it is able to isolate the treatment effect for canvass-
ing even though all members of the canvass group also received a leaflet because the leaflet
group was used as a control group from which an instrumental variable analysis could be
conducted. In this way, it was possible to mimic the design of a campaign a local Conserva-
tive party would normally run whilst retaining the ability to make a causal inference. With
households as the unit of randomization and contact, individual voters, from whom the out-
come of voter turnout is measured, are clustered within these households. We take account
of this feature of the design at the analysis stage. Since we intended to estimate mobiliza-
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tion effects by partisan group, it was important that the constituency office pre-recorded
detailed data of the voting intentions of subjects based on previous canvassing campaigns.2
We divided our sample into three main categories: Conservative supporters, supporters of
rival parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, Green Party etc.), and unattached voters
(non-identifiers, non-voters and subjects with missing party identification data). We chose
to rely on three broad partisan groups because canvasser data is a noisy measure of party
support. While in the United Kingdom it is common practice for voters to volunteer their
voting intentions to canvassers from rival parties, they sometimes choose to report vaguely,
indicating for instance that they are ‘Against Conservatives’. Moreover, the ‘out-partisan’
category has been validated using traditional phone interviews (Foos 2015, chapter 3). As
the extensive robustness checks reported in the analysis section demonstrate, our findings
are robust to a more fine-grained operationalization of party support.
The interview protocol was finalised after a pilot carried out on 15 and 16 April at 159
addresses, which were removed from the sample before randomisation. The protocol for the
canvass group was a door knock at the intervention group addresses where the canvasser
sought to talk to a person on the electoral register. The canvasser left a leaflet—either to
give to the respondent or put through the door if there was no response. The canvasser
recorded whether a contact had taken place and even a brief opening of the door counted.
The message was a standard question about whether the respondent was intending to vote
Conservative and an encouragement to vote for the party. The script ran as follows: ‘Good
morning/afternoon/evening. I am from the Conservative Party. (Hand over leaflet). I am
just checking to see if you are going to vote Conservative in the upcoming European elections.’
If response was yes/no and the person is the only elector in the household, the canvasser
went on to say: ‘I am very glad/sorry to hear about that. We look forward to getting your
2Canvassers make written records of the party the respondent indicates they are going support in the
forthcoming poll and which are updated at each election and are available for around 58% of registered
voters. These are recorded in the following way: B = BNP, G = Green, I = Independent, M = possible
Lib Dem, T = possible Labour, U = Undecided, C = Conservative, P = possibly Conservative, S = Labour
(socialist), L = Lib Dem, K = UKIP, W = Won’t vote (various reasons including religious beliefs) and A =
Against Conservative.
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vote/I’m sorry we won’t be getting your vote but thank you anyway.’ If the response was
yes/no and there were other electors in the household the script was: ‘I am very glad/sorry to
hear about that. And which way are other members of the household voting? Thank you for
your help.’ There was no script beyond this point. The canvasser did not give any indication
that the respondent should turn out in general or that turnout was a good thing, eschewing
the classic GOTV techniques such as emphasising civic duty. In some cases conversations
carried on about matters in local politics or anything else of interest to the voter as there
was an emphasis on keeping the contact natural and informal. In practice, the intervention
was usually short, lasting about two minutes.3 The canvasser recorded which person from
the household he or she had spoken to and whether they intended to vote Conservative or
not, or noted which other party they intend to vote for or whether not intending to vote.
The constituency office produced lists of addresses from the canvass treatment and then
created walkways. Canvassing was carried out during the three weeks before the election
date. There were twelve canvassers in total, including the local MP, but the local councillors
carried out most of the door knocks.4 Canvassers attempted to treat subjects in 1,000
households and were successful at contacting 406 households including a total of 808 subjects.
This represents 41% of households or 43% of subjects that were cluster-randomly assigned
to the canvassing treatment. The group of compliers includes 252 Conservative voters, 204
supporters of rival parties and 354 subjects who were listed as unattached. Leaflets delivered
via mail were the same as those received by the canvass group (see Figure 1). This printed
document showed pictures of three local politicians (not the European candidates, but the
local MP and two councillors), and invited the respondent to vote Conservative. There was
no explicit GOTV message. The control households were left alone.
3One of the researchers visited the constituency office on 20 May and accompanied one of the canvassers,
a locally elected representative, on the campaign.
4This raises the possibility that canvassers differ in their effect on voters. However, the specific person
was not randomly assigned, so any analysis would be observational.
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Figure 1: Leaftet given to all treatment households in Keynham North and Keynham South.
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Data were recorded in the constituency office. Before random assignment, the party made
available data about party support available to us, which it had recorded in previous can-
vassing efforts. In order to perform a randomization check, we also obtained pre-treatment
data on (verified) turnout in the 2010 General Election, and the sex of the voter. In order to
check if, taken together, our pre-treatment covariates significantly predict treatment assign-
ment, we regress assignment to one of the two treatment groups (1) or to control (0) on all
available pre-treatment covariates (2010 turnout, gender and pre-treatment party support),
and conduct a joint f-test. The p-value of .16 indicates that covariate differences between
treatment and control groups are not statistically significant (Table A1 in the Supporting
Information provides detailed information on covariate balance between treatment and con-
trol groups).5 After the election in May 2014, turnout data were requested from the local
authority and matched to the dataset. Data were prepared by the office and were sent to
the researchers.
Results
Table 1 and Tables A3 and A4 in the Supporting Information present the results from eight
logistic regression models of the combined ground campaign, as well as the two campaign
interventions separately, on turnout. In all models, standard error estimates are clustered
by household to account for assignment to treatment and control groups at the household
5In addition, we use randomisation inference to test whether we can reject the sharp null hypothesis that
any existing imbalance in pre-treatment covariates between the experimental groups could have occurred due
to sampling variability alone. To perform the randomization-inference-based balance check, we first extract
the log likelihood statistic resulting from a multinomial logistic regression of treatment assignment on all
available pre-treatment covariates. We then compare the extracted log likelihood to the mean of all log
likelihoods that we obtain after simulating cluster random assignment within each of the two experimental
blocks 5,000 times. The resulting p-value of .79 indicates that we cannot reject the sharp null hypothesis
that pre-treatment covariates are not systematically related to treatment assignment. We are therefore
confident about the balanced nature of treatment and control groups. Moreover, we perform a further
balance check using the same procedure, but including interactions between pre-treatment party-support,
turnout and gender. Again, we find no evidence that treatment assignment within partisan strata was
systematically related to previous turnout or gender. Figure A1 in the Supporting Information shows where
the log likelihood resulting from a multinomial logistic regression of treatment assignment on pre-treatment
covariates falls within the sampling distribution of all test statistics obtained after re-assigning households
to treatment and control under the sharp null hypothesis.
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level. The coding of the party identification variable differs in Table 1 and Tables A3 and A4.
While Table 1 shows treatment effects conditional on the three larger partisan sub-groups
outlined in the research design section, Tables A3 and A4 include a detailed breakdown
of support for rival parties and a more finely-grained categorization of unattached voters,
demonstrating that our results are not driven by our operationalization of pre-treatment
partisan subgroups.
Model 1 in Table 1 shows the overall results of the Conservative canvassing and leafletting
campaign compared to the untreated control group. It is clear that, overall, the campaign
interventions, if at all, had a negative effect on turnout, significant at the .10 level. Mod-
els 2, 3, and 4 include interactions with pre-treatment party support dummies testing our
differential mobilization hypothesis that the campaign increased turnout among support-
ers of the Conservative Party more than turnout among supporters of rival parties such as
Labour. Model 3 adds the pre-treatment covariates gender and validated turnout in the 2010
General Election, while Model 4 also adds interactions between treatment assignment and
pre-treatment covariates, testing whether the conditional treatment effects by partisanship
are driven by compositional differences within partisan groups. Models 5 to 8 replicate the
aforementioned steps, breaking the ground campaign down into its constituent parts, namely
whether a household was sent a leaflet only, or if the household was also assigned to personal
contact with a Conservative Party canvasser. Table 1 Models 2 and 6 clearly demonstrate
that campaign interventions had a different (more negative) effect on the turnout of rival
party supporters and unattached voters than on the turnout of Conservative Party support-
ers. The differential effects are statistically significant with p<.05.
Models 3 and 4 show that the differential effect for supporters of rival parties is robust
to the inclusion of pre-treatment covariates as well as to the inclusion of interactions of
pre-treatment covariates and the treatments, suggesting that the key result is not a function
of observed compositional differences between partisan subgroups. Moreover, the interac-
tions of the treatments with unattached subjects show that the differential effect uncovered in
12
Ta
bl
e
1:
Lo
gi
st
ic
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
of
Tu
rn
ou
t
on
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
A
ss
ig
nm
en
t,
co
nd
iti
on
al
on
Pa
rt
y
ID
I
II
II
I
IV
V
V
I
V
II
V
II
I
C
am
pa
ig
n
(L
ea
fle
t
or
C
an
va
ss
)
-.1
29
+
.1
66
.1
94
-.0
87
(.0
77
)
(.1
37
)
(.1
38
)
(.1
84
)
Le
afl
et
-.0
78
.2
70
+
.2
78
+
.1
19
(.0
89
)
(.1
60
)
(.1
62
)
(.2
15
)
Le
afl
et
&
C
an
va
ss
-.1
82
*
.0
70
.1
16
-.3
04
(.0
91
)
(.1
59
)
(.1
59
)
(.2
14
)
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
R
ef
er
en
ce
R
iv
al
Pa
rt
y
.0
90
.3
95
**
*
.4
33
**
.4
23
**
.0
87
.3
95
**
.4
33
**
.4
22
**
(.0
93
)
(.1
49
)
(.1
52
)
(.1
50
)
(.0
93
)
(.1
49
)
(.1
52
)
(.1
50
)
U
na
tt
ac
he
d
-.7
09
**
*
-.4
80
**
.0
02
-.0
95
-.7
11
**
*
-.4
80
**
.0
02
-.0
95
(.0
86
)
(.1
40
)
(.1
47
)
(.1
50
)
(.0
85
)
(
.1
40
)
(.1
47
)
(.1
50
)
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
x
C
am
pa
ig
n
R
ef
er
en
ce
R
iv
al
Pa
rt
y
x
C
am
pa
ig
n
-.4
96
**
-.5
20
**
-.5
09
**
(.1
90
)
(.1
93
)
(.1
92
)
U
na
tt
ac
he
d
x
C
am
pa
ig
n
-.3
68
*
-.3
52
+
-.1
88
(.1
76
)
(.1
80
)
(.1
88
)
C
on
s
x
Le
afl
et
R
ef
er
en
ce
R
iv
al
Pa
rt
y
x
Le
afl
et
-.5
52
*
-.5
34
*
-.5
24
*
(.2
20
)
(.2
24
)
(.2
22
)
U
na
tt
ac
he
d
x
Le
afl
et
-.4
51
*
-.4
18
*
-.3
33
(.2
07
)
(.2
10
)
(.2
20
)
C
on
s
x
Le
afl
et
&
C
an
va
ss
R
ef
er
en
ce
R
iv
al
Pa
rt
y
x
Le
afl
et
&
C
an
va
ss
-.4
56
*
-.5
22
*
-.5
22
*
(.2
30
)
(.2
31
)
(.2
33
)
U
na
tt
ac
he
d
x
Le
afl
et
&
C
an
va
ss
-.2
94
-.2
94
-.0
43
(.2
07
)
(.2
10
)
(.2
20
)
N
or
th
.0
01
.0
04
.0
46
.0
45
.0
01
.0
03
.0
46
.0
44
(.0
75
)
(.0
75
)
(.0
76
)
(.0
76
)
(.0
75
)
(.0
75
)
(.0
76
)
(.0
76
)
C
ov
ar
ia
te
s
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
C
ov
ar
ia
te
s
x
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
61
23
N
ot
e:
C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
**
*
p<
0.
00
1,
**
p<
0.
01
,*
p<
0.
05
,+
p<
0.
1
13
Models 2 and 6 is, in fact, a function of observable compositional differences with unattached
voters, ex-ante, less likely to vote than party identifiers and the treatment being more ef-
fective with higher propensity voters. If our theory that rival party supporters are put off
voting by contact from a rival campaign because of their partisanship is correct, then that is
exactly what we should observe: robust differential effects of the treatment between Conser-
vative supporters and supporters of rival parties, and differential effects between Conservative
supporters and unattached voters due to compositional differences related to pre-treatment
turnout propensity.
Tables A3 and A4 displays a further robustness check, dividing the three partisan sub-
groups using all available information on partisanship from the Conservative campaign office.
The significant negative interaction effects displayed in Table A4 between both treatments
and the Labour Party dummy show that the negative effect for rival party supporters is
driven by supporters of the largest rival party, the Labour Party: treatments had a signifi-
cantly more negative effect on Labour supporters than on Conservative supporters.
Moreover, Table A3 demonstrates that the negative effect for unattached voters is mainly
driven by subjects with missing data on the party identification variable, and not by self-
declared non-voters and non-identifiers, who turn out more when treated.
Figure 2 plots the marginal changes in predicted turnout probabilities derived from Table
1 and Table A4 models 6 and 8 (adjusted for all available pre-treatment covariates and the
interactions between pre-treatment covariates and assignment to campaign contact). The
predicted ITTs are estimated while holding covariates at their mean. Figure 2 clearly shows
that the differences in treatment effects between Conservative supporters and rival party
supporters is statistically significant and amounts to 12 percentage points (unadjusted) or
11 percentage points (covariate-adjusted).
We also correct for multiple comparisons by applying the Benjamini and Hochberg cor-
rection, which controls the False Discovery Rate (FDR). We follow the method outlined by
Coppock (2015). Since analysis includes pre-treatment covariates displayed in Table 1 Model
14
Figure 2: ITT Effects of Canvassing on Turnout, conditional on Party ID
Note: Bars denote 95% Confidence Intervals.
First row: three-group specification, Second row: seven-group specification
First column: unadjusted, Second column: covariate-adjusted
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4, we performed subgroup analysis for each of the three partisan subgroups, we begin by
ordering the three p-values from the smallest to the largest. Then we look for the largest
p-value that satisfies: pk <= (k/m) ∗ α, where k is the p-values index, m is the number
of tests, and α is .10. According to Coppock (2015), this p-value and all smaller p-values
remain statistically significant at the .10 level. The corrected p-values in Table 2 show that
the interaction between the campaign and the rival partisan group (the key finding of this
paper) remains significant at the .05 level with p=.024.
Since in 1 Model 8 we performed two hypothesis tests for each of the three partisan
subgroups, we again order the six p-values from the smallest to the largest, and locate the
largest p-value that satisfies: pk <= (k/m) ∗ α, where k is the p-values index, m is the
number of tests, and α is .10. The corrected p-values in Table 2 show that, if we decompose
the campaign treatment, the interactions between the leaflet and the rival partisan group,
and the canvassing and the rival partisan group, both remain significant, albeit only at the
.10 level, with p=.075.
Table 2: Benjamini-Hochberg correction for FDR
Raw p-values Adjusted p-values
Table 1 Model 4
Cons x Campaign .635 .635
Rival Party x Campaign .008** .024*
Unattached x Campaign .316 .474
Table 1 Model 8
Cons x Leaflet .155 .232
Cons x Canvass & Canvass .582 .698
Rival Party x Leaflet .025* .075+
Rival Party x Leaflet & Canvass .018* .075+
Unattached x Leaflet .846 .846
Unattached x Leaflet & Canvass .130 .232
Note: Two-tailed tests, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table 3 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression of difference in turnout
behaviour between the 2010 General Election and 2014 European Elections as a function of
treatment assignment, pre-treatment party support and the interaction between treatment
16
Table 3: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Change in Turnout between 2010 and 2014 on
Treatment Assignment, conditional on Party ID
M1 M2
Demobilization Mobilization Demobilization Mobilization
vs no change vs no change vs no change vs no change
Campaign -.324* -.387 -.285* -.357
(.127) (.253) (.139) (.266)
Conservative Reference
Rival Party -.377* .144 -.375** .141
(.141) (.267) (.141) (.267)
Unattached -1.257*** .693** -1.256*** .686**
(.137) (.220) (.137) (.220)
Conservative x Campaign Reference
Rival Party x Campaign .478** .115 .477** .115
(.179) (.353) (.179) (.353)
Unattached x Campaign .058 .163 .058 .166
(.178) (.285) (.178) (.284)
North -.097 .198 -.096 -.196+
(.074) (.108) (.074) (.108)
Covariates No Yes
Covariates x Treat No Yes
N 6123
Note: Two-tailed tests *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
assignment and pre-treatment party-support.6 Model 2 also includes the pre-treatment co-
variate, sex, and interactions between treatment assignment and gender. The dependent
variable is coded -1 if the subject turned out in the 2010 General Election and abstained
in the 2014 European election, 0 if the subject abstained in both elections or turned out in
both elections, and 1 if the subject abstained in the 2010 General Election but turned out
in the 2014 European election.
From the low salience electoral context and light-touch nature of both campaign interven-
tions, we expect that the campaign should change the electoral behaviour of General Election
voters either by activating the existing connection between party and voter, and thus pre-
venting them from abstaining in the lower salience, European elections, or by pushing them
6Since turnout as a whole, and conditional on pre-treatment party support does not differ significantly
as a function of being canvassed compared to receiving the leaflet only (see Table A5 in the Supporting
Information), we restrict our analysis to the effect of campaign contact compared to no campaign contact.
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across the abstention threshold (in the case of rival party supporters).
This change is exactly what we observe with Conservative supporters. The main treat-
ment effects in Table 3 show that the campaign reduced second order election abstention
among Conservative voters who voted in the 2010 General Election. In contrast, the statisti-
cally significant interaction effect with supporters of rival parties shows that those subjects,
if they voted in 2010, were significantly less likely to be prevented from abstaining than
subjects who supported the Conservative Party. Figure 3 plots the marginal changes in
predicted probabilities for each type of voter derived from Table 3, Models 1 (displayed in
column 1) and 2 (displayed in column 2). The first row shows how the treatment affected
low salience abstention compared to continuing with General Election turnout behaviour.
The second row plots how the treatment affected continuity between low and high salience
turnout behaviour, and the third row displays mobilization effects among General Election
non-voters. The marginal effects plots show that Conservatives are around 8 percentage
points more likely to stick with their General Election turnout behaviour when assigned to
contact either by leaflet or door-to-door, and those who stick are 7 percentage points more
likely to keep on voting. On the other hand, supporters of rival parties who voted in the 2010
General Election are 3 percentage points more likely to abstain from voting in the European
elections (n/s) when assigned to treatment as compared to control, but also 2 percentage
points less likely to start voting in the Europeans (n/s), which means that the significant and
negative main effect on turnout among rival party supporters observed in Figure 2 may be
a composite of higher abstention among General Election voters and lower turnout among
2010 General Election non-voters (e.g. subjects that were too young to vote in 2010).
Discussion and Conclusion
Large-scale partisan campaign experiments that randomize contact at the aggregate level
often report positive effects on parties’ vote shares while failing to detect effects on aggregate
18
Figure 3: Change in Turnout from General Election 2010 to European Election 2014 as
Function of Treatment Assignment, conditional on Party ID
Row 1: Voter 2010 -> Non-voter 2014
Row 2: No change 2010-2014
Row 3: Non-voter 2010 -> Voter 2014
Column 1: unadjusted, Column2: covariate-adjusted
Note: Bars denote 95% Confidence Intervals.
19
turnout (Ramiro, Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012; Pons 2014; Pons and Liegey 2016;
Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2014). But are these effects entirely due to persuasion as
the literature suggests? By developing a theory of differential mobilization and testing it on
individual-level data collected from a randomized field experiment conducted in collaboration
with the North East Somerset Conservative Party, we show that campaigns can affect the
partisan composition of the electorate in favor of the party that initiates contact, while
leaving aggregate turnout unchanged.
Null results, or even negative results, on turnout should not be surprising given that par-
tisan campaigns have different strategic objectives than civic campaigns. As Gerber (2004)
points out, winning an election may sometimes involve reducing turnout among opponents.
This outcome is particularly likely in multi-party systems where supporters of the party that
initiates contact only make up a fraction of voters that are targeted by a campaign. The
aim of this research was to test the differential impact of two common campaign methods on
supporters of different parties. Differential partisan effects of door-to-door canvassing and
leafleting on turnout have so far either been ignored because most partisan campaign exper-
iments are based on samples that exclude rival party supporters (e.g. Nickerson, Friedrichs,
and King 2006) or because they lacked detailed information on pre-treatment party support
(e.g. Pons 2014). We show that parties might be skilled at mobilizing their core voters to
turn out while deterring voters of rival parties by using the same campaign intervention.
Taking the case of one major party’s campaign in the 2014 European and local elections
in an English parliamentary constituency, the research examined the differential turnout
hypothesis, confirming that both the campaign overall, but also each intervention, leaflet-
ing and canvassing, separately affected the composition of the electorate favorably from the
standpoint of the Conservative Party. Our results suggest that differential mobilization may
be an important feature of partisan campaigning and should be explored further. While
the causal mechanism leading to demobilization effects among opponents could be cognitive
dissonance or cross-pressure induced through contact with a rival campaign, it may also be
20
the case that campaign contact from an opposing party causes frustration and discontent
with politics in general.
It should also be borne in mind that in European and local elections turnout is relatively
low by UK (but not by US) national election standards. In a General Election when turnout is
higher and all parties are attempting to contact voters, and when voters consider the election
to be more important, incentive for party loyalists to turnout in favor of their preferred
party may be stronger. It therefore remains to be tested whether differential mobilization
is generalizable to high salience elections. Of course, in the comparative context, where
electoral systems and party competition differ, differential mobilization may also vary in its
importance.
For scholars of GOTV and partisan campaigns, it might not be surprising that the script
routinely delivered to voters at the doorstep by Conservative Party volunteers in North East
Somerset was no more effective at affecting turnout than a simple campaign leaflet. The
standard canvassing script used by the Conservative Party contained no specific behavioral
cues that have been shown to make personal appeals more effective at getting out the vote
(Green and Gerber 2008; Nickerson 2007). This experiment is therefore a reminder that voter
contact statistics, as published routinely by political parties in the UK and elsewhere in the
run-up to an election, are not necessarily a good indication of the effectiveness of a party’s
ground operation. In this way, the findings, if replicated, might qualify other studies of
partisan mobilization that have stressed the general importance of face-to-face interaction.
Used heavily by Conservative campaigns in marginal seats during the 2015 UK General
Elections, the effectiveness of the campaign leaflet in North East Somerset, a Conservative-
Labour marginal, might help to explain some of the party’s unexpected victories despite
Labour’s advantage in making door-to-door contact.
Our results show that contacting registered voters via leaflet and door-to-door canvassing
are both effective at changing the composition of the electorate in a low salience election.
This paper provides a novel explanation for the surprising empirical regularity that partisan
21
campaigns often fail to increase turnout both at the individual and the aggregate level.
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Supporting Information
Table A1: Covariate balance, by experimental group & partisanship
Canvass Leaflet Control
North
Conservative 30.3 28.9 30.3
Against Con 8.8 8.7 10.0
Labour 8.0 11.7 11.5
LibDem 4.1 1.8 3.1
Undecided 7.1 6.6 9.0
Non-voter 1.7 2.2 1.8
Missing 39.9 40.0 34.3
Female 51.3 50.9 50.4
Unknown 0.9 1.3 0.6
Turnout 2010 43.1 42.8 46.4
N 3253
South
Conservative 27.4 22.1 21.3
Against Con 13.8 16.7 13.0
Labour 8.4 9.1 10.4
LibDem 2.2 3.0 2.8
Undecided 2.1 2.3 3.2
Non-voter 0.9 0.8 1.1
Missing 45.3 46.0 48.3
Female 54.0 53.8 51.4
Unknown 0.9 1.2 1.4
Turnout 2010 45.3 46.7 48.5
N 2870
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Table A2: Turnout rates by experimental block and pre-treatment party support
Canvass Leaflet Control Combined
North
Combined 28.2 29.1 30.1 29.2
(974) (980) (1299) (3253)
Conservative 34.9 36.7 34.8 35.4
(295) (283) (394) (972)
Against Cons 27.9 38.8 37.7 35.2
(86) (85) (130) (301)
Labour 28.2 29.6 38.0 32.9
(78) (115) (150) (343)
LibDem 45.0 55.6 50.0 49.0
(40) (18) (40) (98)
Undecided 29.0 27.7 21.4 25.1
(69) (65) (117) (251)
Non-voter 29.4 27.3 13.0 22.6
(17) (22) (23) (62)
Missing 21.3 20.4 22.5 21.5
(389) (392) (445) (1226)
Canvassing contact rate 41.4 0.0 0.0 12.4
South
Combined 25.6 28.9 31.4 28.8
(909) (923) (1038) (2870)
Conservative 34.1 42.6 29.9 35.3
(249) (204) (221) (674)
Against Cons 43.2 31.8 45.9 39.9
(125) (154) (135) (414)
Labour 25.0 34.5 49.1 37.7
(76) (84) (108) (268)
LibDem 20.0 60.7 31.0 39.0
(20) (28) (29) (77)
Undecided 15.8 28.6 27.3 24.7
(19) (21) (33) (73)
Non-voter 37.5 14.3 18.2 23.1
(8) (7) (11) (26)
Missing 15.8 18.4 25.0 20.0
(412) (425) (501) (1338)
Canvassing contact rate 44.6 0.2 0.0 14.2
Note: Number of observations in parentheses.
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Table A3: Logistic regression of turnout on treatment assignment, conditional on Party ID
I II III IV
Campaign -.127+ .165 .197 -.037
(.077) (.137) (.139) (.187)
Conservative Reference
Against Cons .108 .380* .438* .429*
(.113) (.181) (.182) (.181)
Labour -.021 .411* .431* .424*
(.125) (.192) (.196) (.194)
LibDem .383* .386 .451 .437
(.191) (.300) (.308) (.304)
Undecided -.505** -.519* -.440+ -.449+
(.168) (.267) (.267) (.265)
Non-voter -.621* -1.05+ -.786 -.834
(.286) (.578) (.569) (.568)
Missing -.740*** -.458** .125 .028
(.088) (.144) (.154) (.159)
Cons x Campaign Reference
Against Cons x Campaign -.433+ -.449+ -.436+
(.231) (.233) (.232)
Labour x Campaign -.741** -.749** -.743**
(.255) (.260) (.258)
LibDem x Campaign .005 -.134 -.128
( .387) (.407) (.407)
Undecided x Campaign .068 .062 .077
(.341) (.337) (.337)
Non-voter x Campaign .638 .842 .942
(.668) (.659) (.661)
Missing x Campaign -.456* -.470* -.311
(.182) (.187) (.199)
Ward -.010 -.006 .068 .067
(.075) (.075) (.077) (.077)
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Covariates x Treatment No No No Yes
N 6123
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table A4: Logistic regression of turnout on treatment assignment, conditional on Party ID
I II III IV
Leaflet -.074 .270+ .280+ .185
(.089) (.160) (.159) (.218)
Leaflet & Canvass -.183* .069 .120 -.264
(.092) (.159) (.159) (.217)
Conservative Reference
Against Cons .105 .380* .439* .429*
(.113) (.181) (.183) (.181)
Labour -.027 .411* .431* .425*
(.125) (.191) (.196) (.194)
LibDem .385* .386 .451 .438
(.190) (.299) (.308) (.304)
Undecided -.507** -.519+ -.440+ -.449+
(.168) (.267) (.267) (.268)
Non-voter -.626* -1.05+ -.786 -.834
(.286) (.578) (.569) (.568)
Missing -.743*** -.457** .126 .029
(.088) (.144) (.154) (.159)
Cons x Leaflet Reference
Against Cons x Leaflet -.592* .575* -.566*
(.268) (.272) (.281)
Labour x Leaflet -.742* -.710* -.705*
(.288) (.295) (.293)
LibDem x Leaflet .403 .344 .360
(.442) (.472) (.469)
Undecided x Leaflet .009 -.008 -.001
(.403) (.396) (.400)
Non-voter x Leaflet .343 .696 .699
(.775) (.771) (.772)
Missing x Leaflet -.533* -.531* -.467*
(.212) (.218) (.232)
Cons x Leaflet & Canvass Reference
Against Cons x Leaflet & Canvass -.275 -.324 -.315
(.279) (.279) (.281)
Labour x Leaflet & Canvass -786* -.838* -.845*
(.333) (.334) (.336)
LibDem x Leaflet & Canvass -.294 -.498 -.516
(.460) (.482) (.488)
Undecided x Leaflet & Canvass .119 .124 .157
(.402) (.396) (.395)
Non-voter x Leaflet & Canvass .935 .982 1.135
(.718) (.708) (.717)
Missing x Leaflet & Canvass -.389+ -.417+ -.153
(.213) (.218) (.232)
North -.010 -.003 .072 .069
(.075) (.075) (.077) (.077)
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Covariates x Treatment No No No Yes
Observations 6123
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Door-knock and leaflet versus leaflet only
In Table A5 we identify the CACE effect of personal canvassing on turnout. We are able to
isolate the effect of personal contact with a Conservative canvasser from the effect of the
leaflet because all subjects in the two treatment groups received the campaign leaflet. The
Complier Average Causal Effects by partisanship, in our case the subjects who answered
the door when Conservative canvassers attempted to contact them and hand-over the
leaflet personally, are displayed in Table A5 . If Yi is turnout, di indicates whether personal
contact with the canvasser was made, zi is treatment assignment either to the leaflet only
condition (zi = 0) or the leaflet and canvassing condition (zi = 1), then the two-stage least
squares model we estimate for the CACE can be written as:
Yi = β0 + β1di + β2RivalPartyi + β3Unattachedi + β4di ∗RivalPartyi + β5di ∗ Unattachedi
+µi, in which
di = γ0 + γ1zi + γ2RivalPartyi + γ3Unattachedi + γ4zi ∗RivalPartyi + γ5zi ∗ Unattachedi + i
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Table A5: Instrumental variable regression of turnout on canvassing instrumented by assign-
ment to canvassing or leaflet condition, conditional on Party ID
I II III IV
Canvassing -.051 -.047 -.100 -.158+
(.044) (.042) (.082) (.093)
Conservative Reference
Rival Party -.023 -.019 -.035 -.023
(.027) (.026) (.038) (.037)
Unattached -.170*** -.055* -.189*** -.082*
(.022) (.022) (.031) (.033)
Conservative Reference
Rival Party x Canvass .050 .015
(.116) (.111)
Unattached x Canvass .081 .128
(.100) (.103)
Ward .012 .018 .011 .019
(.019) (.018) (.019) (.018)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Covariates x Canvass No No No Yes
N 3786
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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